STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

1983

ECOCIDE
noun
destruction of the natural environment,
especially when deliberate.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

(Directed-Energy Warfare)

Caspar Weinberger

(U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1981-1987)

The Official Story

CASPAR WEINBERGER
(U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1981-1987)

Caspar Willard Weinberger GBE (August 18, 1917 – March 28, 2006) was an American politician and businessman. As a Republican, he served in a variety of state and federal positions for three decades, most notably as Secretary of Defense under President Ronald Reagan from January 1981 to November 1987.

Weinberger was a member of the California State Assembly from 1953 to 1959. He also served as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and Director of the Office of Management and Budget under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. He later became vice president and general counsel of Bechtel Corporation.

Weinberger’s tenure as Secretary of Defense was marked by his hard line against the Soviet Union, in disagreement with the State Department. He promoted the Strategic Defense Initiative. He was indicted on charges of lying to Congress and obstructing government investigations as part of the Iran–Contra investigation, but was pardoned by President George H. W. Bush before facing trial. Weinberger was awarded both the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1987 and an honorary British knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II. In 1993, he became Chairman of Forbes magazine.

Secretary of Defense

Weinberger was vying for Reagan to appoint him as Secretary of State but was given the position of Secretary of Defense instead.

Weinberger took the lead in implementing a rollback strategy against Soviet communism. In 1984, journalist Nicholas Lemann interviewed Weinberger and summarized the strategy of the Reagan administration to roll back the Soviet Union:

Their society is economically weak, and it lacks the wealth, education, and technology to enter the information age. They have thrown everything into military production, and their society is starting to show terrible stress as a result. They can’t sustain military production the way we can. Eventually it will break them, and then there will be just one superpower in a safe world – if, only if, we can keep spending.

Lemann notes that when he wrote that in 1984, he thought the Reaganites were living in a fantasy world. But in 2016, he says, that passage represents “a fairly uncontroversial description of what Reagan actually did”.

Although not widely experienced in defense matters, Weinberger had a reputation in Washington as an able administrator; his powers as a cost cutter earned him the sobriquet “Cap the Knife”. He shared President Reagan’s conviction that the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to the United States, and that the defense establishment needed to be modernized and strengthened. Belying his nickname, at the Pentagon Weinberger became a vigorous advocate of Reagan’s plan to increase the Department of Defense budget. Readiness, sustainability, and modernization became the watchwords of the defense program. In his early years at the Pentagon, Cap Weinberger was known as “Cap the Ladle” for advocating large increases in defense spending.

As Secretary of Defense, Weinberger oversaw a massive rebuilding of US military strength. Major defense programs he championed included the B-1B bomber and the “600-ship Navy”. His efforts created economic and military-industrial pressures that were associated with the beginning of Perestroika and the beginning of the end of both the Cold War and the Soviet Union. However, this thesis was contested by a study on the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union by two prominent economists from the World Bank – William Easterly, and Stanley Fischer from MIT: “… the study concludes that the increased Soviet defense spending provoked by Mr. Reagan’s policies was not the straw that broke the back of the Evil Empire. The Soviet war in Afghanistan and the Soviet response to Mr. Reagan’s Star Wars program caused only a relatively small rise in [USSR] defense costs. The massive US defense effort throughout the period from 1960 to 1987 contributed only marginally to Soviet economic decline.”

The same study points out the key reason for the economic decline of the USSR was relying on centrally- planned industrial-expansion to drive economic growth, rather than driving growth by increasing worker productivity via incentives; France and Japan were also mentioned (in 1994) as other centrally-planned economies that could soon experience similar troubles. While the Reagan Doctrine was not a key factor in causing the economic implosion of the USSR, which was driven by internal contradictions, the Reagan proxy-rollback policy of the 1980s (which replaced Détente that Nixon and Carter generally pursued during the 1970s) was the key factor in preventing expansion of the Soviet economic empire, and sustenance of their declining domestic economy from external sources. Reagan was one of the few people to predict this possibility. The final piece of the puzzle was the Soviet leadership: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were hardline Communists, and prevented any significant changes, but Gorbachev was a reformer—and once economic reforms and political reforms began, they became unstoppable. British journalist Berrnard Levin wrote in 1977:

I do not believe it possible that the thirst for freedom and decency in the countries of the Soviet Empire can remain much longer unslaked, and that any attempt … to satisfy it by real reforms, will be cataclysmically destructive of the eroded foundations of the entire State system. … there will be no stopping the tide once the first sluice has been opened. Memories of the Czech tragedy of 1968 will still be fresh … the most significant element of the Prague Spring was the way in which, once Mr Dubcek had shown that he supported the Czech desire for liberation, no attempt by him and his equally brave colleagues to go slowly proved availing — the scent of freedom in the nostrils of his people was too strong.

These events came at the cost of helping to triple the US national debt, and funding radicals. Weinberger pushed for dramatic increases in the United States’ nuclear funding, and was a strong advocate of the controversial SDI, an initiative which proposed a space- and ground-based missile defense shield.

Weinberger was reluctant to commit the armed forces, keeping only a token force of American marines in Lebanon that then became victims in the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing.

Unlike President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz, Weinberger did not regard any of Gorbachev’s actions—whether it was perestroika or glasnost—as reassuring indicators of his stated intentions. “Not only did Gorbachev give up all of the Soviet ‘non-negotiable’ demands [regarding the INF Treaty], but he gave us precisely the kind of treaty that the President had sought for seven years. That act of course does not mean—any more than does the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan—that the USSR has given up its long-term aggressive designs.” Initially, Reagan’s views were in line with Weinberger’s views, but he began to reevaluate his perception of Gorbachev’s intentions in 1987, the year Gorbachev accepted the U.S. proposal on INF.

Weinberger resigned as Secretary of Defense on November 6, 1987.

Source: Wikipedia